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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates how negotiators’ relational orientation, operationalised by their Relational 
Self-Construal (RSC), and their relationship strength affect negotiation outcomes in dyadic 
negotiations. 
To measure this effect, participants are purposely assigned to dyads, according to their levels of 
relational orientation (high, low or mixed), and report on their relationship strength. They perform a 
simulated price negotiation exercise, with a buyer and seller condition, resulting in individual and 
joint economic outcomes and subjective value outcomes.  
Results demonstrate a main effect of negotiators’ relational orientation on subjective value 
outcomes. Negotiators from congruent dyads with low relational orientation, obtain lower subjective 
value negotiation outcomes, than negotiators from dyads with incongruent levels of relational 
orientation. No significant effect of negotiators’ relational orientation on economic negotiation 
outcomes can be established.  
Relational orientation of negotiators and the strength of their relationship does not interact in a 
significant way. Thus, whether negotiatiors are friends or strangers does not influence the effect of 
their relational orientation on negotiation outcomes. 
 
Keywords: relational orientation, relationship strength, negotiating dyads, negotiation outcomes 
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RELATIONAL ORIENTATION OF NEGOTIATORS: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS ON 
NEGOTIATION OUTCOMES IN DYADIC NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Negotiation is a fundamental form of social interaction, which is necessary for anyone who 
must accomplish their social objectives in collaboration with others (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Few 
areas in organizational behaviour have developed as rapidly, and profoundly, as the field of 
negotiation (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Kramer & Messick, 1995). 
Historically, the field has been dominated by a focus on economic outcomes (Buelens, Van De 
Woestyne, Mestdagh, & Bouckenooghe, 2008), defined as the explicit terms of an agreement 
(Thompson, 1990). Successful negotiations, however, build on both economic and relational capital 
and many scholars have criticized that the field offers a largely a-relational view of an inherently 
relational situation (Gelfand, Smith Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 
1998; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995), emphasizing autonomy, competition, and rationality over 
interdependence, cooperation, and relationality (Gray, 1994).  
Consequently, a growing body of research argues for the importance of relational capital 
among negotiating parties (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Curhan, Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009; 
Gelfand et al., 2006). This relational capital is defined as including assets of mutual liking, knowledge, 
trust, and commitment to continuing the relationship. High performers are those that are able to 
negotiate with others and develop collaborative agreements, thus placing a high value in relational 
capital (Welbourne & Pardo-del-Val, 2009).  
To acquire relational capital in negotiations, the relational orientation of negotiators can be 
especially crucial (Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008).  Although there has been 
some discussion of relational orientation in negotiation (e.g. Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1993; King & 
Hinson, 1994), this important construct and its psychological and social processes has remained 
relatively ill defined in the field (Gelfand et al., 2006).  
 
Relational orientation as a self-definition 
 
Relational orientation involves primarily the concern for building and preserving 
relationships (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998). Relationally oriented negotiators tend to view 
relationships with the other party as continuous rather than episodic, thus emphasizing long term 
cooperation. They adopt flexible postures (with less resistance to yielding), and avoid relationship 
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impairing tactics. Being concerned with interdependence, cooperativeness and mutuality (vs. 
concern with independence, competitiveness and individualism), they tend to define themselves in 
relation to others (vs. in contrast to others) (Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1993) and thus have a different 
self-definition or self-construal.  
The self is a multidimensional, dynamic knowledge structure that organizes self-relevant 
information (e.g. Cross, Morris, & Gore, 2002; Markus & Wurf, 1987) and consists of multiple self-
representations or self-construals that embody knowledge about oneself (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Self-
construals reflect the extent to which the self is defined as being intertwined and connected to 
others and seperate, unique and autonomous from others (Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000). Singelis 
(1994) defined self-construals as a ‘constellation of thoughts, feelings, and actions concerning one’s 
relationship to others and the self as distinct from others.’ Some self-construals are especially 
central, well-elaborated, and important to an individual; others are less important and are more 
peripheral (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Persons thus also differ markedly in the degree to which others are 
incorporated in their self-system (Cross & Madson, 1997). 
We can distinguish independent and interdependent self-construals (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991). An independent self-construal implies that the person defines himself as autonomous, unique, 
abstracted from the social environment, and independent from others. For individuals with an 
interdependent self-construal, important relationships, group memberships, and social roles define 
the self. Individual characteristics, beliefs and attitudes are relatively less important in their self-
definition. This interdependent self-construal is in turn subdivided in the collectivist interdependent 
self-construal, in which roles and group memberships are importantly self-defining, and the 
relational interdependent self-construal (RSC), in which close relationships are included in the self-
space; when representations of the self are activated, representations of close others will be 
activated also (Cross, & Morris, 2003). The Relational Interdependent Self-Construal reflects a 
cognitive representation of the self as fundamentally interconnected to other individuals (Cross & 
Madson, 1997; Kashima et al., 1995). This cognitive representation guides the processing of 
information relevant to the self and exerts a dynamic impact on cognition (Cross & Madson, 1997; 
Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), emotion (Cross et al., 2002), motivation (Cross et al., 2000; Gardner, 
Gabriel & Hochschild, 2002) and behaviour (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Individuals with a prominence 
of this interdependent self-construal approach relationships differently than those with more 
independent self-construals. The needs and wishes of close others may strongly influence their 
thougths and behaviours. In addition, they tend to take these wishes and opinions of close 
relationship partners into account when making important decisions (Cross et al., 2000). 
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Relationally oriented persons tend to have a prominent Relational Self-Construal (RSC), 
emphasizing their interdependence with others (Cross & Madson, 1997; Kashima et al., 1995). This 
self-construal embodies knowledge about oneself (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) and reflects the extent to 
which a person defines his self as being connected to others (interdependent) versus separate, 
unique and autonomous from others (independent) (Cross et al., 2000). Thus a person with a 
prominent RSC sees others as part of his definition of who he is (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1995). In 
the context of negotiation, relational orientation refers to ‘the degree to which negotiators are cued 
or prone to focus on the importance of the dyadic relationship’ (Curhan et al., 2008). 
 
Relational orientation in negotiations 
 
Recent research suggests that the field of negotiation has large unexplored potential in 
determining the specific traits of negotiators, that predict consistent individual differences in 
negotiation outcomes (Elfenbein, Curhan, Eisenkraft, Shirako, & Baccaro, 2008). Given the inherently 
relational context of negotiation interactions and the fact that negotiation is an especially senstitive 
experience for the self, it seems intuitive that individual differences in relational orientation should 
have a real impact on behaviours and outcomes in negotiation (Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 
2008).  
In the last two decades there has been a proliferation of research in social psychology on the 
self in general and the relational self in particular (Andersen & Chen, 2002; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; 
Cross et al., 2000; Cross & Madson, 1997; Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Despite these considerable 
theoretical and empirical developments, discussions of relational orientation have remained largely 
isolated from the field of organizational behaviour in general and the field of negotiation in 
particular. 
Although relational orientation (RSC)1 is related to other constructs in negotiation literature, 
such as interpersonal orientation (Rubin & Brown, 1975), prosocial motives (De Dreu, Weingart, & 
Kwon, 2000; Van Lange, 1999), other concern (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), relationship orientation 
(Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1993), and relationship preference (King & Hinson, 1994), none captures its 
profundity. Unlike relational orientation, these constructs have not been implicated in cognition, 
motivation, emotion and behaviour, nor do they provide understanding of the conditions that lead 
relational concerns to be prominent or inhibited in negotiations (Gelfand et al., 2006). 
                                                          
1
 In the remainder of this paper we refer to Relational Self-Construal (RSC) as relational orientation for reasons 
of conceptual clarity 
7 
 
 
Conceptualising negotiators’ relational orientation at the level of the self-construal also allows 
researchers to draw upon the extensive research on the self to more clearly specify the mechanisms 
and processes that underlie the relations between this interdependence and negotiation outcomes 
(Cross et al., 2000).   
In this vein, Curhan and colleagues (2008) have indicated that the concept of negotiators’ 
relational orientation has important effects on the accumulation of both relational and economic 
capital in negotiations. Moreover, the accumulation of relational capital is a central goal for 
negotiators for whom relational orientation is central.  
 
Relational orientation and negotiation outcomes 
 
Negotiation outcomes can be grouped into two categories: economic and subjective value 
outcomes (Curhan et al., 2006; Thompson, 1990). Economic outcomes refer to the explicit terms or 
products of the negotiation, such as whether an agreement has been reached, how much joint 
benefit has been created, and how resources are divided or claimed by the individual parties.  
Subjective value outcomes refer to the social, perceptual and emotional consequences of a 
negotiation. This subjective value consists of four interrelated dimensions: feelings about the 
instrumental outcome (i.e. terms of the deal), feelings about the self, feelings about the negotiation 
process, and feelings about the relationship. Subjective value is seen as distinct from any associated 
economic outcome (Miller, 1999), and is especially important as it may serve as a predictor of future 
economic value (Curhan et al., 2009). Focusing on good relationships can be an effective strategy in 
keeping up the cooperation  necessary for greater economic returns in the long run.  
However, researchers also theorize that negotiating dyads in which both parties hold highly 
relational goals or views of themselves are prone to relational accomodation. For the person with a 
high relational orientation, there may be times in which the ‘unit’ of decision making is not the self 
alone but rather the self and the relationship. As a result, these individuals may seek out resolution 
strategies that promote reconciliation and further harmony in the relationship (Cross & Madson, 
1997). This dynamic will result in inefficient short-term economic outcomes (e.g. dollar amount) yet 
high levels of relational capital (e.g. trust and liking) (Curhan et al., 2008; Amanatullah et al., 2008).  
As the accumulation of relational capital is a central goal for negotiators with a high relational 
orientation, we thus expect a strong impact of negotiators’ relational orientation in the first place on 
subjective value negotiation outcomes. 
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H1: Negotiators with a high relational orientation will attain higher subjective value 
negotiation outcomes than negotiators with a low relational orientation.  
As relationally oriented negotiators focus primarily on the importance of the relationship 
with their negotiating partner and less on the pursuit of individual gain, a trade-off between 
subjective value and individual economic negotiation outcomes can take place. However, 
emphasizing interdependence with their partner, they will still engage in the search for a mutually 
beneficial economic outcome.   
H2a: Negotiators with a high relational orientation will attain lower individual and 
higher joint economic negotiation outcomes than negotiators with a low relational 
orientation. 
H2b: Negotiators with a low relational orientation will attain higher individual and 
lower joint economic negotiation outcomes than negotiators with a low relational 
orientation. 
 
Dyadic (in)congruency 
 
In the above hypotheses we implicitly assumed that the negotiating partners have similar 
levels of relational orientation, involving congruency. Yet, often, this may not be the case. As 
negotiation is a dyadic experience, in which the behavior of one’s counterpart invariably affects one’s 
own outcomes, incongruency of relational orientation between negotiators, will also be an important 
determinant of negotiation outcomes (Cross & Madson, 1997; Gelfand et al., 2006). Although the 
impact of negotiator congruency versus incongruency is little researched to date, indirect support for 
this effect can be found in negotiation literature (Mc Ginn and Keros, 2002; Thompson & 
DeHarpport, 1998), suggesting that dyadic incongruency will result in overall lower economic and 
relational capital than dyadic congruency. Based on this theoretical framework and recent research 
(Amanatullah et al., 2008; Curhan et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2006) we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
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H3: In incongruent dyads negotiators’ relational orientation will lead to overall lower 
economic and subjective value negotiation outcomes, compared to congruent dyads. 
 
Negotiation context and relational orientation 
 
To understand how relational orientation affects negotiation outcomes, scholars also have to 
answer the question under which conditions it will be prominent or inhibited in negotiations (Cross 
et al., 2000). Namely, negotiators will only make use of their relational orientation if it is appropriate 
and relevant in the specific negotiation context (Higgins, 1996). This idea that various characteristics 
of situations have the capability to restrict the expression and, therefore, criterion-related validity of 
individual differences is also referred to as situational strength (Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010). As 
such, features of the negotiation context can increase or decrease the use of this relational 
orientation (Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1993; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1995), even before the actual 
negotiation has started, affecting cognitions, tactics, and, ultimately, negotiation outcomes.  
In literature, ‘relationship strength’ is advanced as a critical feature of the negotiation 
context, affecting the use of relational orientation. Relationship strength can be operationalised by 
summing assessments of positive relationship characteristics that would predispose the negotiator to 
value ongoing interaction with the other party (Greenhalgh & Chapman, 1998). Negotiations among 
close friends or romantic partners focus on minimising conflict and prioritize the relationship (Fry, 
Firestone, & Williams, 1983; Thompson, Peterson & Brodt, 1996). Consequently, strong ties between 
negotiators will change their strategies, reducing negotiators’ goals and aspirations. In particular, a 
strong tie between negotiators will make them lower their minimum price, based on the relationship 
(‘I make a better price for a friend’) (Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Bazerman, 1999). Furthermore, 
restricting the influence of strong ties on the matching process of negotiators increases the number 
of economically optimal agreements. Consequently, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4: Relationship strength will moderate the effect negotiators’ relational orientation 
exerts on negotiation outcomes.  
We expect that the stronger the ties between negotiators are, the larger the effect of 
relational orientation on negotiation outcomes will be, independent of negotiators’ levels of 
relational orientation within the dyad.  
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METHOD 
 
Sample 
Research data are collected by means of a sample of graduate students at a leading 
European Business School. The use of students in simulated negotiation tasks is a widely accepted 
methodology in negotiation research (Buelens et al., 2008). Although this procedure is also criticized, 
the newness of the proposed research topic underpins the use of a student sample in a first stage to 
examine the hypotheses.  We obtained data from 270 respondents (135 dyads), of which 126 dyads 
were integrated in further data analysis, after controlling for missing values. All participants received 
a confidential code that ensured them of anonymous data processing. The dyads consisted of both 
men (53%) and women (47%).  Respondents’ ages ranged from 17 to 46 years (M = 18.84, SD = 2.14).  
Measures and procedure  
Relational orientation. In a first testing session all participants (n = 252) filled out the RIC 
Self-Aspects scale (Kashima & Hardie, 2000). This self-report scale uses 10 sets of item triads to 
assess the relative strength of Relational Self, Individual Self and Collective Self, respectively. All 
responses are rated using a 7-point scale (1 = not like me, 7 = very much like me). The results on the 
Relational Self-Aspects subscale yielded the score for negotiators’ relational orientation.  
Participants were purposely assigned to dyads according to their relational orientation level, 
indicated by their score on the Relational Self-Construal subscale of the RIC scale. Consequently, 
three groups of dyads were created: 36 dyads consisted of negotiators with high relational 
orientation (score above the Median of 5.8), 47 dyads consisted of negotiators with low relational 
orientation (score below the Median of 5.8), and 43 dyads consisted of negotiators with high and low 
relational orientation. All participants reported the strength of the tie with their counterpart (1= very 
good friend, friend, or lover; 2= acquaintance or stranger). 
Negotiation simulation. In a second session, participants negotiated an adaptation of the 
‘New Car Negotiation Task’ (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), a multiple issue negotiation between a buyer 
and a seller, concerning the purchase of a new car. This task is similar to tasks used by other 
researchers (e.g. De Dreu, Steinel, & Koole; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Negotiators were randomly 
assigned to a buyer or seller condition, within the dyads, and had to agree upon the repayment, 
warranty, and delivery date of a new car. Two of the three issues (repayment and warranty) were 
integrative or potential logrolling issues, enabling increase in joint value for both parties, and one 
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was a fixed-sum issue (delivery date) , where the parties’ interests were diametrically opposed. The 
experimenter provided participants with specific negotiation instructions, a ‘payoff schedule’, and a 
short post-negotiation questionnaire to report the details of their agreement. Negotiators bargained 
face-to-face for a maximum of 20 minutes and were instructed not to exchange their instructions and 
pay-off schedules.  
Economic negotiation outcomes. Participants negotiated for points, leading to economic 
outcomes: the variable, ‘joint points’, sums the points earned by the buyer and seller, defined as the 
joint profit, a measure of the integrative value of the negotiation. The variables ‘points buyer’ and 
‘points seller’, sum the points earned by buyer and seller individually. Both variables are a measure 
for individual profit. An example payoff schedule, in which each party’s payoffs were defined, is 
provided in Table 1. This schedule describes the points buyers and sellers could gain for each issue. 
Insert Table 1 here 
According to the payoff schedule, each negotiator could earn a maximum of 8000 points or a 
minimum of 0 points. One distributive (compromise) solution would be 2 weeks repayment, 18 
months warranty, and 3 weeks delivery date, yielding each negotiator 2800 points. If negotiators 
were able to integrate their interests, called logrolling, and trade off the repayment and warranty 
issues, agreeing to an immediate repayment and a 30 month warranty (a long warranty rate is more 
important to the buyer; a short repayment period is more important to the seller), the amount of 
joint resources was increased by 30%, and the negotiators divided a total of 8000 points.  
Subjective value negotiation outcomes were measured with the Subjective Value Inventory 
(SVI) (Curhan et al., 2006). This post-negotiation questionnaire contains 16 items on a 7- point Likert 
scale and consists of four subscales (Instrumental, Self, Process and Relationship) measuring: 
- the value of negotiation process (fairness and voice) 
- the instrumental outcome (outcome satisfaction and distributive fairness) 
- the relationship (trust and establishing a good foundation for the future) 
- the self (saving face and living up to one’s standards) 
Negotiators completed the questionnaire individually, which yielded a subjective value score for 
buyers (SVbuyer) and for sellers (SVseller).  
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ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics, alpha reliabilities and correlations for all variables 
assessed in the study. 
Insert Table 2 here 
We conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) with negotiators’ relational 
orientation levels in the dyad (high vs. low vs. mixed) and relationship strength as factors and joint 
profit, individual profit, and Subjective Value (SV) as dependent negotiation outcome variables. 
H1 predicted higher subjective value outcomes for negotiators with a high relational 
orientation. From the analyses a main effect of negotiators’ relational orientation on the SV 
outcomes of negotiators was observed. We found a significant effect on the SV of the buyer with 
F(2,123)= 3.56, p < .05, and a marginally significant effect on the SV of the seller, with F (2,123)= 2.25, 
p=.08. We thus could confirm a difference in SV between the different levels of relational 
orientation. We performed post-hoc Scheffé tests to find which factor levels significantly differed 
from the others. Although buyers with a high relational orientation obtained higher SV (M= 5.13, SD= 
0.66), than those with a low relational orientation (M= 4.96, SD= .75) and the SV of sellers with a high 
relational orientation (M= 5.33, SD= 0.72) is higher than the SV of those with a low relational 
orientation (M= 4.96, SD= 0.58), we could not find a significant difference in SV between negotiators 
with high and low relational orientation.  
H2 stated that negotiators’ relational orientation will affect economic negotiation outcomes. 
However, we found no significant main effects of negotiators’ relational orientation on joint profit or 
individual profit.  
The third hypothesis (H3) predicted that incongruent dyads, consisting of negotiators with 
dissimilar relational orientation levels, will attain lower economic and subjective value outcomes 
than congruent negotiating dyads. From the post-hoc test results we could conclude that negotiators 
from dyads with low relational orientation score significantly lower on the subjective value outcomes  
than negotiators from incongruent dyads (SVbuyers: MD= .39, SE= .14, p < .05; SVsellers: MD= .23, 
SE= .13, p= .14). Other non-significant results indicated that, for the seller, the subjective value in 
incongruent dyads (M= 5.18, SD= 0.59) is higher than that in dyads with similar low relational 
orientation, but lower in than congruent dyads with similar high relational orientation. For economic 
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negotiation outcomes we can make no comparison between congruent and incongruent dyads, as no 
significant effect of relational orientation was observed.  
Concerning the fourth hypothesis (H4), we observed no significant interaction effect of 
negotiators’ relational orientation and the strength of their relationship. Thus, whether negotiatiors 
are friends or strangers does not influence the effect of their relational orientation on negotiation 
outcomes. Neither could a main effect of relationship strength on negotiation outcomes be 
observed. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Already two decades ago, researchers suggested that until relationships were studied by 
negotiation scholars, our ability to analyse real-world negotiations would always remain inadequate 
(Greenhalgh, 1987). However, it was not until the last decade that the field of negotiation has given 
increasing attention to the relationship between negotiating parties. The quality of the relationship 
was found to be important beyond the particular issues at stake and the resources being divided. 
This study aimed to contribute to the negotiation literature by disentangling the effects of 
negotiators’ relational orientation and relationship strength on negotiation outcomes. Despite strong 
theoretical considerations and some studies in the same area of interest (Curhan et al., 2008; 
Gelfand et al., 2006), only a significant difference in subjective value (SV) outcomes between 
different negotiator levels of relational orientation could be confirmed. However, no proof of better 
SV outcomes for high relationally oriented negotiators, compared to low relationally oriented 
negotiator, was established. Neither did we find corroboration for the impact of negotiators’ 
relational orientation on economic negotiation outcomes.  
These results are inherently caused by the data analysis technique and its related 
assumptions. For the multivariate test procedures of MANOVA to be valid, three assumptions must 
be met: (1) independent observations, (2) the variance-covariance matrices must be equal for all 
treatment groups, and (3) the set of dependent variables must follow a multivariate normal 
distribution. The most basic violation of an assumption occurs when there is a lack of independence 
among observations (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2006). In our study, observations from individual 
negotiators are most likely not independent, as the data are hierarchically nested with observations 
at a lower individual level being nested within an upper dyad level. Observations of negotiators from 
the same dyad tend to be more similar than observations from different dyads (Kenny, Cashy, & 
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Cook, 2006) and consequently the assumption of independence is violated. If dependence is found 
among groups of respondents, then a possible solution is to combine those within the groups and 
analyze the group’s averaged score instead of the scores of the separate respondents (Hair et al., 
2006). We applied this technique for our data analysis, although we acknowledge that the multilevel 
technique of dyad analysis (Kenny et al., 2006), as an important tool for the estimation of dyadic 
models, would be more appropriate for our data. It allows us to test the degree of nonindependence 
and to disentangle both actor and partner effects of relational orientation on negotiation outcomes. 
We thus can make a distinction between the amount of variance in negotiation outcomes that is 
explained by the negotiator’s own relational orientation on the one hand and his negotiating 
partner’s relational orientation on the other hand. Once we have mastered this technique, we will 
repeat data analysis for this study and observe the implications on its results.  
Taking a closer look at the negotiation case of our study, one can discern the integrative 
potential, based on the in-built possibility for negotiators to logroll two of the three issues at stake. 
This integrative potential exists primarily in multiple issue negotiations (Thompson, 1998), whereby, 
given a set of preferences, negotiating parties can maximize the joint gain available within the 
context of the situation. Higher joint gain is a product of an integrative solution (Kurtzberg, 1998). In 
our study, however, the negotiation instructions directed participants to aim at a maximization of the 
number of points gained for themselves. This might have led them to focus more on the distributive 
aspect of the negotiation, to the detriment of creating a win-win situation and integrative value with 
their partner. Since persons with a high relational orientation specifically focus on interdependence 
and rapport building with their partner, one could assume that these instructions have resulted in 
relationally oriented negotiators not making use of their relational orientation. In literature this 
phenomenon is referred to as relational orientation (RSC) accessibility, or the level of readiness with 
which relational orientation is used to respond to a stimulus or social situation (Bruner, 1957; 
Higgins, 1996). Namely, for relational orientation of a negotiator to be central, it is not only its 
availability (is it present or not) that is important, but even more its accessibility. Self-knowledge can 
be available in memory, but unless it is accessible, it will not be used to process information. Thus 
the more accessible relational orientation is, the more self-defining it is for an individual.  
Although there are many factors that might affect relational orientation accessibility, 
situational contexts and individual differences are two broad classes of variables implicated in 
previous research (Cross et al., 2000). The accessibility of relational orientation for a person is an 
additive function of both individual and situational variables (Bargh, Bond, Lomabardi, & Tota, 1986; 
Higgins, 1989), leading to a specific overall accessibility strength (Higgins, 1996). In the literature, 
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‘relationship strength’ (Fry et al., 1983; Tenbrunsel et al., 1999; Thompson, et al., 1996), ‘expectance 
of future interaction’ (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Valley, Neale, & Mannix, 1995), 
and ‘organizational and occupational lines’ (Curhan et al., 2008; Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998) have 
been advanced as critical features of the negotiation context, affecting the use of relational 
orientation. In this study we have investigated relationship strength between negotiators as a 
situational moderator of the relational orientation - negotiation outcomes relationship. Although we 
found no significant effect of relationship strength, we suspect that it nevertheless is present but 
unobserved because of low judged usability or applicability of relational orientation by negotiators 
(Higgins, 1996). Namely, accessibility will not automatically translate into knowledge use. When 
persons feel that use of their relational orientation would be irrelevant, inappropriate, or not 
applicable to a specific context, they will not make use of it. Negotiators who anticipate a future 
cooperation are more likely to feel more dependent on each other, and are more motivated to 
develop a working relationship than negotiators who do not anticipate such a relationship (Pruitt & 
Rubin, 1986). The time horizon of the simulated negotiation exercise was short-term, with no 
expectance of future interaction between the negotiators. This most probably discouraged 
negotiators to make use of their relational orientation as they deemed it not applicable for this one 
shot interaction, leading to non-observance of the relationship strength effect between negotiators.  
 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
The findings in this study are subject to a number of limitations, pointing out the need for 
future research. First, we have studied the effects of negotiators’ relational orientation in a multiple 
issue negotiation case with integrative potential. However, one can wonder whether these 
hypotheses would hold in a purely distributive negotiation case, where you can find another effect of 
relational orientation. Namely, in this situation negotiators will tend to focus on the division of 
available resources, whereas in an integrative bargaining setting they will be inclined to increase the 
joint gain available to the negotiating parties and show problem-solving behaviours (Walton & 
McKersie, 1966). We suggest that further research investigates the impact of relational orientation in 
different negotiation settings.  
Second, participants self-reported on the strength of the relationship with their negotiating 
partner. However, their sense of being interconnected with one another and experiencing closeness 
will not automatically result in close behaviour with each other. Further research on the relational 
self in negotiations should address this matter by clearly discerning negotiators’ inclination towards 
their partner versus actual close behaviour with their partner. We hypothesize that this behaviour 
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(resulting from a sense of being close with the other) most likely will exert a dynamic impact on the 
process and outcomes of the negotiation. The Inclusion of Others in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron, Aron, 
& Smollman, 1992), measuring two related components of closeness: ‘feeling close’ and ‘behaving 
close’ has potential to meet this concern, with ‘behaving close’ as a measure of relationship strength. 
Furthermore, future research should go beyond the scope of relationship strength as a critical 
contextual variable affecting the relational orientation – negotiation outcomes relationship, towards 
an investigation of the interplay between individual and situational antecedents of the accessibility 
and applicability of relational orientation and consequently also the effect of relational orientation 
on negotiation outcomes. 
Third, we measured relational orientation with the RIC Self-Aspects scale of Kashima and 
Hardie (2000), which is developed in the field of social psychology. Another existing measure of 
relational orientation is the Relational Interdependent Self-Construal (RISC) scale (Cross et al., 2000). 
Despite the value of these instruments, there is still a critical need to develop and incorporate good 
measures of relational constructs into negotiation research (Gelfand et al., 2006). Future research 
should aim to develop a measurement instrument of relational orientation, specifically adapted to 
the context of negotiation. 
Finally, our model tested the relationship between relational orientation on the one hand 
and negotiation outcomes on the other hand. A pertinent critique is the narrow focus of this design, 
as it largely overlooks the underlying mechanism through which this linkage occurs. We find 
negotiation research on relationships has studied the link between relationships and the negotiation 
process on the one hand (e.g. De Dreu & Van Lange, 1995; Greenhalgh & Gilkey, 1993), and between 
relationships and negotiation outcomes (e.g. Amanatullah et al., 2008; Greenhalgh & Chapman, 
1998) on the other hand, but scholars have ignored the underlying mechanism through which this 
linkage occurs. Opening this ‘black box’ to study the underlying process and understand via which 
tactics and strategies negotiators’ relational orientation impacts on negotiation outcomes is an 
important avenue for future research. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Table 1 
Negotiators’ payoff schedules for the adapted New Car Negotiation Task 
 
Repayment 
 
     Warranty         Delivery date 
 
 
 
Instant        (0) 
In 1 week   (400) 
In 2 weeks  (800) 
In 3 weeks  (1200) 
In 4 weeks  (1600) 
 
 
 
 
Instant       (4000) 
In 1 week  (3000) 
In 2 weeks (2000) 
In 3 weeks (1000) 
In 4 weeks (0) 
 
 
 
   Buyer payoffs 
 
   6 months  (0) 
  12 months (1000) 
  18 months (2000) 
  24 months (3000) 
  30 months (4000) 
 
 
 Seller payoffs 
 
   6 months  (1600) 
  12 months (1200) 
  18 months (800) 
  24 months (400) 
  30 months (0) 
 
 
 
        5 weeks (0) 
        4 weeks (600) 
        3 weeks (1200) 
        2 weeks (1800) 
        1 week   (2400) 
 
 
 
         
        5 weeks (2400) 
        4 weeks (1800) 
        3 weeks (1200) 
        2 weeks (600) 
        1 week   (0) 
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Table 2 
Means, standard deviations and correlations between study variables (N = 252) 
 
Variable M SD     1    2    3   4    5     6       7        
          
          
1. Relational orientation dyad 
 
n.a. n.a. (.81)       
2. Relationship strength n.a. n.a. -.13 (n.a.)      
3. Individual profit Buyer 4632 852 .046 .064 (n.a.)     
4. Individual profit Seller 
 
5. Joint profit 
 
6. Subjective Value  Buyer 
 
7. Subjective Value Seller 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
4606 
9238  
5.14 
5.11 
901 
1001 
.70 
.63 
 
 
-.013 
.027 
.27** 
.12 
0 
2 
.026 
.031 
.022 
.012 
1 
2 
 
-.35** 
.54** 
.45** 
-.18* 
1800 
6400 
(n.a.) 
.60 
-.12 
.35** 
600 
7200 
 
(n.a.) 
.27**  
.16 
5800 
10400        
 
 
(.84)     
.13 
2.50 
6.69  
 
 
 
(.79) 
3.06  
6.69  
 
   Note Coefficient alphas are on the diagonal; ** p < .01, * p < .05 
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Table 3 
Results of the Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) 
 
Source Dependent 
variable 
 SS  df  MS F           p 
      
      
Relational orientation dyad 
(H1 – H3) 
SV buyer 3.34 2 1.67  3.56        .03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SV seller 
Individual 
profit buyer 
Individual 
profit seller 
Joint profit 
1.77 
555434.92 
 
27032.90 
 
825044.89 
 
2 
2 
 
2 
2 
.87 
412522.44 
 
277717.46 
13516.45 
2.25        .11 
.41        .69 
 
.38        .98 
 
.02        .67 
 
 
Relational orientation dyad x  
Relationship strength 
(H4) 
 
 
SV buyer 
SV seller 
Individual 
profit buyer 
Individual 
profit seller 
Joint profit 
 
.01 
.09 
55.49 
 
3.46 
 
23.60 
 
2 
2 
2 
 
2 
2 
 
.00 
.05 
27.75 
 
1.73 
11.80 
 
 
.02         .98 
2.38         .10 
.61          .55 
 
.03          .97       
.40          .67 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
